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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
Case No. 1E218 
-v-
STEVEN M. JOHNS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a verdict and judgment of guilty 
rendered on one count of aggravated kidnapping and two counts of 
aggravated sexual assault in the Seventh Judicial District Court 
in and for Carbon County, State of Utah, the Honorable Boyd 
Bunnell, Judge. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks to have his convictions reversed or, 
in the alternative, to have this case remanded for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about the 12th day of October, 1977, the prosecutrix 
consented to drive her girlfriend of longstanding and her girlfriend's 
boyfriend, the appellant, in her pickup truck from Wellington, Utah, 
to Woodside, Utah, where the latter were intending to spend the 
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night (Tr. 20, 21, 123, 138, 139). At Woodside, the girlfriend's 
mother opposed the appellant's staying overnight and the girlfriend 
suggested that the appellant return to Wellington with the 
prosecutrix. Not wishing to cause any difficulty, the appellant 
agreed to return, and the proxecutrix consented to give him a ride 
back in her truck (Tr. 23, 125, 140). During the course of their 
return, the prosecutrix and the appellant engaged in conversation 
which led to sexual ralations (Tr. 23-30, 135, 141-47, 150). The 
couple then drove to Price, Utah, where at the prosecutrix's 
request they stopped for a soft drink. Appellant remained inside 
the truck while the prosecutrix entered the store. While in the 
store the prosecutrix reported that she had been raped (Tr. 34, 36, 
38, 148). 
The appellant was charged with one count of aggravated 
kidnapping in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 302(l)(b), 
Utah Code Annotated, and with two counts of aggravated sexual 
assault in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 405 (l)(a)(ii), 
Utah Code Annotated. 
During pre-trial conference and in chambers, the 
prosecution made a motion in limine to bar the appellant from 
introducing evidence as to the prosecutrix's reputation for sexual 
permissiveness and immoral character, evidence as to witnesses' 
opinions of the prosecutrix's sexual permissiveness and immoral 
character, evidence of che proxecutrix's sexual habits and cuscoms. 
and evidence of specific instances of behavior which establish the 
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prosecutrix's sexual habits and customs. The motion was made with 
no prior notice to the appellant. The court granted the motion 
and limited the appellant to examination of the prosecutrix's 
general reputation in the community (Tr. 3-6). 
At trial, because of the motion in limine and fear of 
contempt, appellant's counsel was unable to effectively examine 
witnesses as to the prosecutrix's reputation for sexual permissive-
ness and immoral character; counsel was unable to examine witnesses 
as to their opinions of the prosecutrix's sexual permissiveness 
and immoral character; counsel was unable to examine the appellant 
as to his opinion of the prosecutrix's sexual permissiveness and 
immoral character based upon representations made to him by the 
prosecutrix; and counsel was unable to examine the prosecutrix 
as to her sexual habits and customs and prior specific instances 
which '>·.muld establish said habits and customs. 
The jury found the appellant guilty on all three counts 
charged. 
The appellant retained new counsel and filed his notice 
of appeal on December 28, 1978. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR, 
UNDER THE CO~ITROLLING DECISIONS OF THE UTAH 
SUPREME COURT, THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, AND 
THE HELL REASONED DECISIONS OF OTHER JURIS-
DICTIONS, IN GRA~ITING THE PROSECUTION'S MOTION 
IN LD1INE, WHICH DENIED THE APPELLAJ.'lT HIS 
OPPORTUNITY TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE AS TO THE 
-3-
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PROSECUTRIX'S REPUTATION FOR SEXUAL PERMIS-
SIVENESS AND IMMORAL CHARACTER; EVIDENCE AS 
TO WITNESSES' OPINIONS OF THE PROSECUTRIX'S 
SEXUAL PERMISSIVENESS AND IMMORAL CHARACTER; 
EVIDENCE AS TO THE APPELL}NT'S OPINION OF 
THE PROSECUTRIX'S SEXUAL PERMISSIVENESS AND 
IMMORAL CHARACTER BASED UPON PEPRESENTATIONS 
MADE TO HIM BY THE PROSECUTRIX; EVIDENCE AS 
TO THE PROSECUTRIX'S SEXUAL HABITS AND CUSTOMS; 
AND EVIDENCE OF SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF BEHAV-
IOR WHICH ESTABLISH THE PROSECUTRIX'S SEXUAL 
P~ITS AND CUSTOMS, WHICH EVIDENCE WAS 
CRITICAL TO THE ISSUES OF THE PROSECUTRIX'S 
CONSENT AND THE APPELLANT'S LACK OF CRIMINAL 
INTENT AS TO ALL COUNTS OF ALLEGED CRIMINAL 
CONDUCT. 
It should be noted at the outset that while the appellant's 
contentions advanced in this brief more directly impact the two counts 
of aggravated sexual assault, they impact the single count of 
aggravated kidnapping as well. The single basis for all three counts 
is the alleged forced sexual acts (aggravated sexual assault) and 
the alleged forced restraint necessitated therefor (aggravated 
kidnapping). Thus, the points contended for here, which raise the 
issues of consent and lack of criminal intent, go both to the 
prosecutrix's willingness to engage in sexual acts -- therefore no I 
aggravated sexual assault and, due to this willingness, an absencE 
of forced restraint -- therefore no aggravated kidnapping. 
The factual focal point involved in the instant case is 
whether the sexual acts engaged in by the prosecutrix and the 
appellant were forced or consensual. The appellant contends as his 
defense that they were in fact consensual. 
In order to ~aintain this defense at trial, i~ ~as neces-
sary that the appellant be gi~en the oooort~ni:~ to i~croduce all 
-4-
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evidence relevant and material to the issue of the proxecutrix's 
consent, including evidence as to the proxecutrix's reputation for 
sexual permissiveness and immoral character, evidence as to wit-
nesses' opinions of the prosecutirx's sexual permissiveness and 
immoral character, evidence of the prosecutrix's sexual habits and 
customs, and evidence of specific instances of behavior which es-
l 
tablish said habits and customs. This opportunity was severely 
limited, if not entirely thwarted, by the trial court's granting of 
the prosecution's motion in limine restricting the appellant's scope 
of examination to what the trial court referred to as the prosecutrix's 
"general reputation in the community." (Tr. 5) As a direct conse-
quence of this ruling, the appellant was effectively deprived of 
his defense. 
State v. Howard, 544 P.2d 466 (Utah 1975), is the leading 
Utah case in this area. There the Utah Supreme Court was presented 
with a factual situation involving an allegation of rape analogous 
to the instant case. The court found, as is the case here, that the 
association between the parties involved came about in a sociable 
and peaceable manner, so that there was a genuine and critical issue 
as to whether the sexual relations had been consented to. The court 
then said: 
It is in such instances that the probative 
value of the victim's reputation as to 
moral character is sufficient to outweigh 
the negative factors and justify the ad-
mission of such evidence. at p. 470 
The court based its conclusion in part on the Utah Rules 
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... when a trait of a person's character 
is relevant as tending to prove his conduct 
on a specified occasion, such trait may be 
~roved in the same manner as provided b* 
ule 46 ... (Emphasis added:) at p.70 
As the court further stated, Rule 46 allows for the proof of such 
a trait by evidence of reputation. Although not directly in issue 
in Howard and therefore not addressed by the court, Rule 46 also 
allows for evidence in the form of opinion to prove such a trait. 
Thus, under the Howard rationale, where consent to sexual relations 
is at issue in a sexual assault case, both evidence as to the pros-
ecutrix's reputation for sexual morality and evidence in the form 
of opinion as to the prosecutrix's sexual morality is admissible. 
As for the admissibility of opinion evidence on the pros-
ecutrix's sexual morality, it should be emphasized that both the 
opinions of witnesses and the opinion of the appellant are admissible 
Both are of substantial probative value on the issue of the pros-
ecutrix's consent. In addition, the opinion of the appellant is 
of critical importance in determining the appellant's state of mind 
during the incidents in question and specifically whether the 
appellant had formed the necessary criminal intent. If, for example. 
the prosecutrix made representations to the appellant that gave 
the impression that she was sexually permissive and the appellant 
formed this opinion of her, the appellant's opinion would be a 
critical factor in determining lvhether he reasonab:i.y believed tha: 
the prosecutrix was consensually engaging in their subsequent 
sexual relations and, thus. whether :he appel:ant lacked the 
-6-
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necessary criminal intent to compel the prosecutrix's submission 
to these relations. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in dictum in the Howard case, 
also referred to the admissibility of specific acts of the pros-
ecutrix. The court stated: 
. though it is not proper to permit 
inquiry into specific acts of prior 
misconduct of the victim, where the 
critical issue is consent, and the cir-
cumstances are such that it reasonably 
appears that evidence concerning her 
moral character would have sufficient 
probative value to outweigh any detri-
mental aspects of admitting such tes-
timony, it should be admitted. 
(Emphasis added.) at p. 469 
It is somewhat ambiguous as to whether the court, in saying that 
"it should be admitted," is making a reference back to the "specific 
acts" of the proxecutrix or a reference generally to "evidence 
concerning her moral character." The appellant suggests that the 
Utah Rules of Evidence, specifically Rules 49 and 50, support the 
reading of the court's language that would admit, under the limited 
circumstances specified, evidence of specific acts of the prosecu-
trix concerning her moral character. 
Rule 49 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that: 
Evidence of habit or custom is relevant 
to an issue of behavior on a specified 
occasion, but is admissible on that issue 
only as tending to prove that the be-
havior on such occasion conformed to 
the habit or custom. (Emphasis added.) 
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Evidence of specific instances of be-
havior is admissible to prove habit 
or custom . (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, pursuant to Rule 49, in a sexual assault case, where the issue 
is the prosecutrix's consent to sexual relations, evidence of the 
prosecutrix's habitual or customary behavior as to sexual relations 
should be admissible as tending to prove that the behavior in 
question conformed to the habit or custom. Furthermore, under 
Rule 50, evidence of specific instances of behavior should be admis· 
sible to establish what the particular habits or customs are. 
The appellant contends, in view of the cited language and 
rationale of ~oward and the import of the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
that the trial court should have permitted the appellant to examine 
witnesses as to the prosecutrix's reputation for sexual permissive-
ness and immoral character, examine witnesses as to their opinions 
of the proxecutrix's sexual morality, examine the appellant as to 
his opinion of the prosecutirx's sexual morality, examine witnesses 
and the prosecutrix as to the prosecutrix's sexual habits or customsl 
and examine witnesses and the prosecutrix as to specific instances 
of behavior establishing said habits or customs. This contention 
also finds support in the case law of other jurisdictions. 
In People v. Battilana, 126 P.2d 923 (Calif. 1942), the 
California court ruled that: 
Evidence of the general reputation of the 
rosecutrix for unchastitv to ether with 
speci ic acts in proot thereo were com 
pent with respect to the two charges of 
rape, since the defendant admitted ~aving 
had intercourse with her. ~ut asserted 
-8-
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that she voluntarily submitted to that 
relationship. (Citations omitted.) 
(Emphasis added.) p. 929 
Similarly, in People v. Hurlburt, 333 P.2d 82 (Calif. 1958), the 
court restated the California position: 
... if consent is the issue, as it is 
in a forcible rape charge, evidence of 
prior earticular acts of unchastity is 
admiss~ble on the issue of consent. 
(Citations omitted.) (Emphasis added.) 
p. 85 
A number of other jurisdictions have adopted positions similar to 
that in California and that contended for here. See, District of 
Columbia (Matter of JWY, 363 A.2d 674 (D.C. 1976)); Kansas (Interest 
of Nichols, 580 P.2d 1370 (Kansas 1978)); Kentucky (Sanders v. 
Commonwealth, 269 S.W.2d 208 (Kent. ____ ));Minnesota (State v. Hill, 
244 N.W.2d 728 (Minn. 1976)); Nebraska (State v. Tiff, 260 N.W.2d 
296 (Neb. ____ )); New Mexico (State v. Herrera, 582 P.2d 384 (N.M. 
1978)); Tennessee (Guy v. State, 443 S.W.2d 520 (Tenn. 1970)); 
Texas (Burton v. State, 471 S.W.2d 817 (Texas 1971)); and Virginia 
(Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135 (Virg. 1978)). 
In conclusion, as to Point I, the appellant contends that 
the trial court's granting of the prosecution's motion in limine 
effectively denied him the opportunity of proving his defense --
t~at the prosecutrix consented and that he lacked the necessary 
criminal intent. The appellant further contends that had any or 
all of the evidence of reputation, opinion, habits or customs, and 
specific acts been admitted, there is a reasonable likelihood that 
the verdict rendered by the jury would have been different and that 
-9-
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the trial court's ruling was, therefore, prejudicial and should 
be reversed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
ERRONEOUSLY DEFINING AND LIMITING THE SCOPE 
OF REPUTATION EVIDENCE, WHICH ERROR EFFECTIVELY 
DENIED THE APPELLANT HIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXAMINE 
THE WITNESSES ON THE PROSECUTRIX'S GENERAL 
REPUTATION AS TO MORAL CHARACTER. 
As stated under Point I, the appellant at trial sought 
to prove his defense -- the prosecutrix's consent -- but was met 
by the prosecution's motion in limine which restricted the 
appellant's examination to what the trial court characterized as 
the prosecutrix's "general reputation in the cotmnunity." The trial 
court, during the course of the trial, enlarged the scope of 
"general reputation" to include the prosecutrix's reputation as to 
"~exual morality," but then the court proceeded to erroneously 
define and limit the scope of reputation evidence so that the 
appellant was effectively denied the opportunity to examine the 
witnesses on any aspect of the prosecutrix's reputation. 
The following exchange (Tr. 127-129) which took place 
during the appellant's counsel's examination of a witness, recapped 
in relevant part, contains the trial court's erroneous definition 
of and limitation upon the scope of reputation evidence: 
Q. (By Ms. Taylor (appellant's counsel at trial)) 1 
Had vou known her and known of her to the 
coin~ where vou would be able to make a I 
~taternent \vith re ard co her (the ' 
reputation in t e communitv •.-1i::h co 
sexual behavior? (Emphasis added. 
-10-
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THE WITNESS: Yes. (Emphasis added.) 
Q. (By Ms. Taylor) And would you state 
for the jury your knowledge of the 
reputation that she does have in the 
community with regard to this? 
... THE COURT: I think we have to 
limit it, of course, to the general 
reputation of as to chastity and 
sexual morality, as I recall -- are 
the phrases that are used. So if 
you want to rephrase your question 
in that regard. 
Q. (By Ms. Taylor) Would you make a 
statement with regard to chastity 
or her morality? 
THE COURT: Sexual morality. 
MS. TAYLOR: Sexual morality. 
(Objection by the prosecution for 
lack of foundation.) 
THE COURT: No. I think we leave it 
to cross-examination. We feel there's 
enough foundation. I believe she can 
give her opinion as to these items. 
Q. (By Ms. Taylor) You do have an opinion? 
A. Yes. 
THE COURT: As to general reputation 
we're talking about. 
Q. (By Ms. Taylor) We realize it is your 
opinion and it is your own. Will you 
tell the jury what that is, please? 
A. I'd rather not. (Emphasis added.) 
. HR. BOUTWELL (the prosecutor): 
She:s got to give t~e.opinion of 
soc~ety, not er op~n~on. 
(Emphasis added.) 
THE \HTNESS. I don't know what the 
-11-
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opinion of society is. 
MR. BOUTWELL: There. That's fine. 
I move to strike anything she's 
said prior to this in this regard. 
THE COURT: The obtection will have 
to be sustained, i she doesn't 
know what society's opinion is ... 
(Emphasis added. 
Thus, after the witness had testified that she could make 
a statement as to the prosecutrix's reputation in the community 
with respect to sexual morality, the trial court, with the help of 
the prosecution, erroneously defined and limited the scope of 
reputation evidence to "society's opinion." The witness, clearly 
not wanting to testify to her friend's (the prosecutrix's) reputa-
tion anyway as evidenced by her first reply, "I'd rather not" 
then said with apparent relief that she did not know what the 
"opinion of society" was. It is obvious that the only explanation 
for the witness' sudden change in first saying that she could make 
a statement as to the prosecutrix's reputation in the community and 
later saying that she did not know society's opinion is that the 
witness perceived a difference between the community and -the- societ:: 
as a whole. 
It is without question that reputation evidence is not 
limited to the "opinion of society." As Rule 63 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence states, reputation evidence refers to the reputation o: 
the person "in the community in ,...,hich he resides" or the reputatic~ 
of the person "in a group with \vhich he habitually associates." 
In the instant case. the witness testi~ied :hat she was 
-12-
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able to give the prosecutrix's reputation "in the community" 
(Tr. 127) and most likely, as a close friend of the prosecutrix, 
the witness would also have been able to give the prosecutrix's 
reputation among close friends or "habitual associates." The 
erroneous definition, supplied by the prosecution and given effect 
by the trial court, confused the witness by equating the prosecu-
trix's community with society as a whole, thereby allowing the 
witness to escape a difficult situation and not testify to a critical 
fact that she was indeed qualified and required to testify to. 
Furthermore, the trial court's definition ignored the fact that 
reputation evidence may speak to one's reputation in small circles 
of friends, precluding the witness from testifying to this form 
of reputation. 
In conclusion, as to Point II, the appellant contends 
that the trial court, in erroneously defining and limiting the 
appellant's examination into reputation evidence, committed rever-
sible error as had the reputation evidence concerning the prosecu-
trix's sexual morality been admitted as the Utah Rules of Evidence 
provide, there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have 
rendered a different verdict. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FIRST AND SECOND RULINGS WITH 
RESPECT TO THE PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF EXAMINATION 
CONCERNING THE PROSECUTRIX'S SEXUAL MORALITY 
•,JERE INCONSISTENT, CAPRICIOUS AND INHERENTLY 
UNJUST, THEREBY DEPRIVING THE APPELLANT OF DUE 
PROCESS OF LAW. 
As referred to in Points I and II, the trial court granted 
-13-
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the prosecution's motion in limine which restricted the scope of 
the appellant's examination concerning the prosecutrix's sexual 
morality. A second conference in chambers was held during the 
course of the trial wherein the trial court ruled that evidence 
of the prosecutrix's predisposition to sodomy may be admitted. 
(Tr. 6) However, the trial court held steadfast to its earlier 
granting of the motion in limine and refused admission of similar 
evidence tending to show the proxecutrix's proclivities toward 
extramarital sexual intercourse or sexual permissiveness in general 
Even though the appellant had been charged with both the offense of 
forcible sodomy and the offense of forcible sexual intercourse 
(in the two counts of aggravated sexual assault), the trial court 
elected to treat evidence negating the element of force as to each 
offense differently. 
The admission of evidence showing a predisposition to 
one type of sexual activity while prohibiting the same kind of 
evidence as to the other is illogical and inconsistent and further 
reflects the trial court's misunderstanding and misapplication of 
the law. The announcement of such a rule is in effect an arbitrary 
and capricious interpretation of the Utah Rules of Evidence in 
violation of the Utah Constitution Article I, Section 24, which 
provides: 
All laws of a general nature shall 
have uniform operation. 
Clearly, there is no uniformity Hhatsoever in the ::rial court's 
allowing evidence negating the force element as to one type of 
-1-+-
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sexual activity and prohibiting the same evidence as to another 
type of sexual activity. 
The appellant should have been given the opportunity 
to put forth evidence as to the prosecutrix's inclinations to both 
types of sexual activity sodomy and extramarital sexual inter-
course. The trial court's prohibition as to evidence of the latter, 
given its allowance as to evidence of the former, constitutes 
reversible error as had the jury been able to hear evidence of 
the prosecutrix's predisposition to extramarital sexual intercourse 
and sexual permissiveness in general there is a reasonable likeli-
hood that the jury would have rendered a different verdict finding 
the prosecutrix's overall consent to the sexual episode. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANTING OF THE PROSECUTION'S 
MOTION IN LIMINE DEPRIVED THE APPELLANT OF HIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONT HIS ACCUSOR. 
Through its granting of the proxecution's motion in limine, 
the trial court prevented the appellant from presenting crucial 
evidence which with reasonable likelihood would have altered the 
verdict. Evidence would have been offered to show the probability 
of the prosecutrix's consent, and evidence would have been offered 
to show the appellant's lack of criminal intent. This crucial 
deprivation was the equivalent of a denial of appellant's right to 
confront his accusor, a right guaranteed by both the Utah and the 
United States Constitutions, both explicitly and implicitly, as 
part of due process. 
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that: 
that: 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides 
In criminal prosecutions the accused 
shall have the right . . . to testify 
in his own behalf, to be confronted 
by the witnesses against him . . . . 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution mandates 
No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property without due 
process of law. 
Similarly, the sixth amendment to the United States 
Constitution, as incorporated by the fourteenth amendment, requires 
that in state proceedings: 
(t)he accused shall enjoy the 
right . to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him . 
As the Utah Supreme Court previously stated in State v. 
Vasquez, 121 P.2d 903 (Utah, 1942): 
The right of confrontation, in a 
constitutional or bill of rights 
sense, is more than the dictionary 
definition, viz., to meet face to 
face. A trial is more than a 
meeting of a defendant by witnesses 
face to face and silently. The 
confrontation is the meeting of the 
proof or evidence as understood by 
the interested parties according to 
their understanding. at p. 906 
The evidence which appellant was prevented from intro-
ducing went to his own understanding of what transpired; it went, 
as well, to the issue of the prosecutrix's consent, that is. to 
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the veracity of her testimony. Addressing the role of evidence, 
the Utah Supreme Court has stated in State v. Sibert, 310 P.2d 
388 (Utah, 1957): 
The function of evidence is to assist 
the jury in arriving at the truth, 
and if it has any logical tendency to 
destroy or support the veracity of the 
witness, it is relevant to be considered 
as bearing upon his credibility. 
at p. 391-392 
Hence, following the formulations of the right to confront 
one's witnesses as articulated by the Utah Supreme Court and the 
role of evidence in general, the appellant was denied his 
constitutional rights as guaranteed by the Utah and United States 
Constitutions. 
CONCLUSION 
As evidence critical to the appellant's defense that the 
prosecutrix consented to the sexual relations and that the appellant 
lacked the necessary criminal intent, and as evidence whose probative 
value substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect, the trial 
court committed reversible error in denying the appellant his 
opportunity to put forth at trial evidence of the prosecutrix's 
reputation as to sexual permissiveness and immoral conduct, both in 
the community and in small circles of friends, evidence as to 
witnesses' opinions of the prosecutrix's sexual permissiveness and 
immoral conduct, evidence of the appellant's opinion of the pros-
ecutrix's habits and customs with respect to sexual behavior, and 
evidence of specific instances of behavior which establish said 
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~-. 
habits and customs. In addition, the trial court committed 
r898rsible error in its inconsistent rulings as to the admiss 
of evidence negating the element of consent as to the offense 
forcible sodomy while refusing the same evidence as to the offense 
of forcible sexual intercourse, denying the appellant due 
Furthermore, the trial court's rulings effectively denied the 
appellant his constitutional right to confront his accuser. 
Wherefore, the appellant seeks to have his convictions 
reversed or, in the alternative, to have this case remanded for 
a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSEN AND HANSEN 
250 East Broad~vay, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
, r -'··c. 
By __ ~~~p~fi~-i~i~~~L~.~-~H:~an~-~s~e~~~=~·~~----~-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief 
of Appellant were served on the office of the Utah State Attorney 
General, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 
this .:;.. ·- ·-'.day of May, 1979. 
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